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This paper extends recent ﬁ  ndings in the search-theoretic literature on monetary exchange regarding 
the welfare costs of inﬂ  ation. We present ﬁ  rst some estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation using the 
“welfare triangle” methodology of Bailey (1956) and Lucas (2000). We then derive a money demand 
function from the search-theoretic model of Lagos and Wright (2005) and we estimate it from U.S. data 
over the period 1900–2000. We show that the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation predicted by the model accords 
with the welfare-triangle measure when pricing mechanisms are such that buyers appropriate the social 
marginal beneﬁ  t of their real balances. For other mechanisms, welfare triangles underestimate the true 
welfare cost of inﬂ  ation because of a rent-sharing externality. We also point out other inefﬁ  ciencies 
associated with noncompetitive pricing, which matter for estimating the cost of inﬂ  ation. We then 
illustrate how endogenous participation decisions can mitigate or exacerbate the cost of inﬂ  ation, and 
we provide calibrated examples in which a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal. Finally, we 
discuss distributional effects of inﬂ  ation.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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1.  Based on this methodology, 
Fischer (1981) and Lucas (1981) 
obtained estimates for the cost 
of 10 percent inﬂ  ation ranging 
from 0.3 percent of GDP to 0.45 
percent of GDP.
Introduction
Assessing the welfare costs of inﬂ  ation requires a sound understanding of the beneﬁ  ts of monetary 
exchange. The search theory of money, developed in the last 15 years from the pioneering works of 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993), offers such a framework. However, the ﬁ  rst generation of 
search models of money were based on assumptions that were too restrictive to be able to deliver 
useful insights for monetary policy (goods and money were indivisible, for example, individuals’ port-
folios were limited to one unit of one object, and so forth). These severe restrictions have been relaxed 
in several recent extensions of the theory, by Shi (1997, 1999), Molico (1999), and Lagos and Wright 
(2005). The extensions have opened up the perspectives for a better understanding of the costs, and 
also maybe beneﬁ  ts, associated with inﬂ  ationary ﬁ  nance. As an example, Lagos and Wright provide es-
timates for the cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation ranging from 1.4 percent of GDP to 4.6 percent of GDP. 
Interestingly, these numbers are signiﬁ  cantly larger than estimates based on the traditional method 
developed by Bailey (1956), which consists of computing the area underneath a money demand func-
tion. For instance, Lucas (2000), using Bailey’s approach, estimates the cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation at 
slightly less than 1 percent of GDP.1 
In this paper we clarify and extend recent ﬁ  ndings provided by models of monetary exchange to 
the evaluation of the cost of inﬂ  ation for society. Our approach consists of relating the measures of the 
welfare cost of inﬂ  ation obtained from different versions of the search-theoretic model of Lagos and 
Wright (2005) with the traditional measures based on the area underneath the money demand func-
tion. We show the conditions under which the two measures are consistent, and those under which 
they differ. We also disentangle the different effects of inﬂ  ation in search models of monetary ex-
change: a real-balance effect, an effect on participation decisions, and a distributional effect. We show 
that the estimates for the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation provided by the basic version of the search model of 
Lagos and Wright coincide with those provided by the Bailey method whenever money holders can 
appropriate the marginal social return of their real balances. This condition is satisﬁ  ed when buyers 
have all the bargaining power to set prices in bilateral trades, or when pricing is competitive. If this 
condition does not hold, then the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation is larger than what traditional estimates 
predict. This discrepancy arises because of a rent-sharing externality associated with noncompetitive 
pricing mechanisms. We establish a simple relationship between the cost of inﬂ  ation, the area under-
neath the money demand function, and the buyer’s share in the surplus of a trade. We also discuss 
various inefﬁ  ciencies associated with different bargaining solutions.
We also extend the Lagos-Wright model by introducing participation decisions and trading fric-
tions. We show that the measures of the cost of inﬂ  ation based on the Bailey methodology are in gen-
eral misleading since they do not take into account the effects of inﬂ  ation on participation decisions. 
We also illustrate how the presence of search frictions can mitigate or exacerbate the welfare cost of 
inﬂ  ation. We provide calibrated examples in which the Friedman rule, where the interest rate is set to 
zero, is not the optimal policy.
The Lagos-Wright model is based on assumptions that yield a degenerate distribution of money 
balances in equilibrium.2  While these assumptions make the model tractable, they prevent an analysis 
of the distributional effects of inﬂ  ation. We reintroduce such effects by considering a simple extension 
of the Lagos-Wright model in which agents receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We discuss the 
distributional effects of monetary policy and the insurance role of inﬂ  ation.
2.  Shi (1997, 1999) constructs a 
different model, which also yields 
a degenerate distribution of 
money balances. The economy 
is populated by households 
composed of a large number of 
members, who pool their money 
balances at the end of each 
period. See also Faig (2004).POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, JANUARY 2006
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The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the methodology Bailey (1956) developed 
to compute the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. Next, we use a search-theoretic model to derive a money 
demand function, and we ﬁ  t this function to the data. This allows us to compute an alternative mea-
sure of the cost of inﬂ  ation and to compare it to the Bailey estimates. Then, the benchmark model is 
extended to discuss the importance of pricing mechanisms. Next, we consider participation decisions 
and search frictions. Finally, we introduce the distributional effects of inﬂ  ation.3
The “Welfare Triangle” 
The traditional approach to measuring the cost of inﬂ  ation was developed by Bailey (1956). The esti-
mates provided by this approach will be useful in explaining some ﬁ  ndings of the search model. Bai-
ley (1956) measures the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation by calculating the area underneath a money demand 
curve over an appropriate interval. We plot in ﬁ  gure 1 the (inverse) demand for real balances, where 
the cost of holding real balances, the nominal interest rate, is represented on the vertical axis. The de-
mand for real balances is downward-sloping since individuals reduce their money balances and resort 
to alternative payment arrangements, such as credit or barter, as the interest rate increases. The area 
underneath the money demand relationship over the interval [m1, m*], the “triangle” ABC in ﬁ  gure 1, 
measures the welfare cost of having a positive interest rate r1 instead of zero. (In this analysis, the in-
terest rate is assumed to vary one to one with the inﬂ  ation rate.) Obviously, the welfare cost of inﬂ  a-
tion is minimized when the nominal interest rate is zero.4  This corresponds to the Friedman (1969) 
rule for optimal monetary policy. In the following, we will measure the cost of inﬂ  ation as the cost of 
raising the interest rate from r0 = 3 percent, interpreted as the interest rate consistent with zero inﬂ  a-
tion, to r1, say, the interest rate associated with 10 percent inﬂ  ation. Graphically, this cost is measured 
by the area ABDE.
We deﬁ ne monetary assets according to the monetary aggregate M1, that is, currency and demand 
deposits.5 Money demand is then deﬁ  ned by the aggregate money balances M1 divided by nominal 
gross domestic product.6  The nominal interest rate, r, is measured by the short-term commercial 
paper rate. In ﬁ  gure 2, we represent each observation (r,m) by a circle for the period 1900–2000.
FIGURE 1 THE WELFARE TRIANGLE
3.  A more detailed presentation of 
the model occurs in appendix 1, 
and the data are given in 
appendix 2.
4.  Since the interest rate is ap-
proximately the sum of a constant 
real interest rate and the inﬂ  ation 
rate, the Friedman rule would 
imply that the inﬂ  ation rate is 
negative and approximately equal 
to the opposite of the real interest 
rate.
5.  Alternatively, several authors, 
including Fischer (1981), deﬁ  ne 
money as high-powered money. 
The operational deﬁ  nition of 
monetary assets is somewhat 
arbitrary. For a discussion, see 
Lucas (1981) and Marty (1999).
6.  By measuring real balances as a 
fraction of domestic output, the 
area of the money triangle can 
be interpreted as the fraction 
of income that is needed to 
compensate individuals for an 
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To measure the welfare triangle, one estimates a curve that ﬁ  ts the observations in ﬁ  gure 2, and 
then computes the appropriate area underneath the implied money demand curve. Lucas (2000) 
considers two speciﬁ  cations for money demand: the log–log speciﬁ  cation,  mr A r () =
−η, where m 
is aggregate real balances divided by output, r is the interest rate, and A and η  are two estimated 
parameters; and the semilog speciﬁ  cation, where mr A e
r () =
−η . In order to estimate the parameters A 
and η we use nonlinear least squares.7  We also estimate the money demand curve by using a kernel 
regression.8 
It can be seen in ﬁ  gure 3 that the welfare cost associated with an interest rate of 13 percent 
(10 percent inﬂ  ation, approximately) is quite different across speciﬁ  cations for the money demand 
function, from slightly more than 0.5 percent to slightly less than 1.5 percent. These differences 
simply reﬂ  ect different ways to ﬁ  t the data. According to the R-squared criterion, the best ﬁ  t is obtained 
for the kernel regression which evaluates the cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation at about 1 percent of GDP.9 
This number is similar to Lucas’s measure. The estimate from the semilog speciﬁ  cation, about 1.5 per-
cent of GDP, is comparable to Lagos and Wright’s smallest estimate of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation.
Search for a Money Demand Curve 
The Bailey approach does not identify explicitly the beneﬁ  ts of monetary exchange for society.10 An 
alternative approach consists of constructing a microfounded model economy in which money has 
an essential role in trades, so that there is a well-speciﬁ  ed demand for real balances and a natural mea-
sure of welfare. A theory that emphasizes the transactional role of money is the search approach of 
monetary exchange pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993). The recent extension pro-
posed by Lagos and Wright (2005) describes an economy in which trades take place under different 
market structures. Some trades occur in a decentralized (or search) market, where buyers and sellers 
are matched bilaterally, and other trades occur in a centralized market. Money is useful because of a 
standard double-coincidence-of-wants problem in the decentralized market: The buyer does not pro-
duce a good that the seller wants to consume. 
FIGURE 2 FITTING MONEY DEMAND
7.  This method is different from the 
one used by Lucas (2000), who 
constrains the curves to pass 
through the geometric means of 
the data and who uses a visual 
test to identify the best ﬁ  t.
8.  The kernel was estimated with a 
local bandwidth computed using 
plug-in techniques, modiﬁ  ed at 
each boundary. See Brockman et 
al. (1993).
9.  For the kernel regression, 
R2=0.6795; for the log–log 
speciﬁ  cation, R2=0.6238; for the 













10. The Bailey analysis is subject 
to the following caveats. It is a 
partial equilibrium analysis that 
assumes away externalities, 
general equilibrium effects, and 
distributional effects. Also, an 
underlying assumption is that 
the government has access to 
nondistorting taxes, so that a 
change in seigniorage revenue 
has no welfare consequences.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, JANUARY 2006
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The instantaneous utility of an agent is
 
uq cq x
bs () () −+ , where qb is the consumption and qs is 
the production in a bilateral match, and x is the net consumption in the centralized market (x is nega-
tive if an agent produces more at night than he consumes).11 The probability of a single-coincidence-
of-wants meeting in which an agent meets someone who produces a good he likes is σ ≤12. There 
are no double-coincidence-of-wants meetings in which agents could use barter. So with probability σ  
an agent is a buyer in a bilateral match, with probability σ he is a seller, and with probability 12 − σ  
he is unmatched. A social planner, who would dictate the quantities to produce and consume, would 
choose qqq
bs == *, where q* satisﬁ  es
 
′ = ′ uq cq (* ) (* ) . The socially efﬁ  cient level of production and 
consumption in the centralized market is indeterminate. The quantity of ﬁ  at money in the economy is 
growing at a constant rate, π, through lump-sum transfers in the centralized market.
Denote z(q) as the real balances that an agent must hold in order to buy the quantityqq ∈[] 0, *  
in a bilateral match. The speciﬁ  c form for z(q) will depend on the assumed pricing mechanism in 
the decentralized market. The Lagos-Wright model can be reduced to one equation that speciﬁ  es the 
quantity qq q
bs ==  traded in bilateral matches. This equation says that an agent chooses the quantity 
q to consume in the decentralized market so as to maximize the expected surplus he gets as a buyer, 
σ uq zq () () − []  minus the cost of holding real balances, rz(q),
q r zq uq zq =− + − [] {} a r g m a x () () (). σ
In order to calibrate the model, we adopt the same functional forms as the ones used in Lagos-
Wright:  uq q () / =− ()
− 1 1
η η , where η ≥ 0 and cq q () = . Furthermore, the matching probability σ
is set to 1/2, so that each agent trades with probability one. Half of the time an agent is a buyer, and 
half of the time he is a seller.12  The money demand function that is estimated is deﬁ  ned as aggregate 
money balances divided by aggregate nominal output. It is equal to  Lz zA =+ () / σ , where A is the 
real output in the centralized market (this quantity is indeterminate in the model) and where z is a 
function of the nominal interest rate, r.13 
FIGURE 3 WELFARE COST OF INFLATION USING THE BAILEY METHOD
11. The linearity of the preferences is 
what guarantees that the distribu-
tion of wealth at the beginning 
of each period is degenerate. 
Intuitively, this linearity eliminates 
wealth effects in the choice of 
real balances and ensures that all 
buyers carry the same amount of 
real balances.
12. Alternatively, one could consider a 
model in which half of the agents 
are buyers in even periods and 
the remaining half are buyers 
in odd periods. This formulation 
would give identical results for the 
cost of inﬂ  ation.
13. Since agents readjust their real 
balances in the centralized 
market, the output A must be at 
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One needs to take a stand on how prices (or terms of trade) are determined in decentralized 
markets in which buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally. We will assume here that the monetary 
transfer from the buyer to the seller is such that the seller is exactly compensated for his production 
cost,  zq cq () () = . This bargaining solution, called the dictatorial solution, is the outcome of a game in 
which the buyer makes an offer which the seller can accept or reject. If the offer is rejected, no trade 
























As in the previous section, the parameters A and η can then be estimated from the data for the U.S. 
economy from 1900 to 2000. The parameter A could be interpreted as the extent of the tax base. The 
parameter η represents the sensitivity of individual real balances to changes in the interest rate. 
In order to measure the welfare cost associated with a given interest rate, r, relative to 3 percent 
(the interest rate consistent with zero inﬂ  ation), we ask the following question. What is the percent-
age of total consumption that individuals would be willing to sacriﬁ  ce in order to be in the steady 
state with an interest rate of 3 percent instead of the steady state associated with r?
In ﬁ  gure 4, we compare the two measures of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation, namely, the compensated 
measure and the welfare triangle measure. The welfare triangle measure is the area underneath the 
money demand function as estimated from the search model. Figure 4 shows that the two measures 
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where  dq dz z q // ( ) = ′ 1 . Compute the area underneath this money demand function over the in-
terval  zz 01 , [] ,
rzd z uqz z uqz z
z
z
() ( ) ( ) . = [] − {} − [] − {} ∫ σσ 11 00
0
1
Using the assumed dictatorial solution, where the seller is exactly compensated for production 
costs,  zc q = () , it is easy to see that the right-hand side of the previous expression is just the change 
in steady-state welfare. So the area underneath the individual demand for real balances coincides with 
the change in steady-state welfare. These two measures do not exactly coincide in ﬁ  gure 4 because 
we express real balances as a fraction of aggregate output and we do not look at the change in steady-
state welfare but at a compensated measure of welfare. 
The welfare cost of a nominal interest rate of 13 percent relative to a 3 percent interest rate is 
about 1.5 percent.14 This measure is bigger than the ones of Lucas (2000) but it accords with the non-
linear least square estimate based on the semilog speciﬁ  cation. The difference between the numbers 
simply stems from different strategies of ﬁ  tting the points in the data. In all cases, the cost of inﬂ  ation 
corresponds to the area underneath a money demand function.15 
Pricing 
The estimate for the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation in the previous section has been obtained by assum-
ing a special pricing mechanism: Buyers are able to extract the whole surplus from trade. Alternative-
ly, one can model prices, and the way in which the surplus from a trade is shared between trading 
partners, differently. In this section, we consider ﬁ  rst a simple bargaining solution, called the pro-
portional solution, which will illustrate the role played by the pricing mechanism in assessing the 
welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. The proportional bargaining solution assumes that the buyer obtains a con-
stant fraction, called the buyer’s share and denoted θ, of the surplus of a match deﬁ  ned as the differ-
ence between the buyer’s utility of consumption and the seller’s disutility of production. Formally,
 
uq zq uq cq () () () () −= − [] θ , and therefore  zq cq uq () () () =+ − () θθ 1 . The dictatorial solution of 
the previous section corresponds to θ  = 1. From the agent’s choice of real balances, one can ﬁ  nd a 
simple relationship between z, individual real balances, and the nominal interest rate, r. Aggregate real 
balances are deﬁ  ned as  Lz zA =+ () / σ . 
We use the same method as before to derive the cost of inﬂ  ation: We estimate the parameters A 
and η of money demand generated by the model, and we use compensated welfare to compute the 
cost of inﬂ  ation. In ﬁ  gure 5, we report the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation for different values for the buyer’s 
share  θ = () 03 05081 ., ., ., .16  When the buyer’s share is less than 1, the cost of inﬂ  ation is typically 
larger than the measure given by the money triangle. In fact, the area of the welfare triangle is ap-
proximately equal to the buyer’s share multiplied by the compensated measure of the welfare cost of 
inﬂ  ation. For instance, if the buyer’s share is 50 percent, the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation is always about 
twice the size of the area of the money triangle (see ﬁ  gure 6). To understand this result, consider the 
area underneath the individual demand for real balances. It satisﬁ  es










∫ = [] − {} − [] − {}
= [] −
σσ
θσ ) )( ) ( ) . [] {} − [] − [] {} θσ uqz cqz 00
14. Assuming a competitive pricing 
mechanism, Rocheteau and 
Wright (2004, 2005) and Reed 
and Waller (2004) ﬁ  nd similar 
estimates for the welfare cost 
of inﬂ  ation, between 1 and 1.5 
percent of GDP.
15. Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein 
(1998) also show, using a 
cash-in-advance model with a 
credit sector, that the welfare 
cost of inﬂ  ation using an 
estimated money demand curve 
is consistent with the prediction of 
the model. 
16. The R2 for the case of θ =10 .  is 
0.6757, which is higher than the 
log–log and semilog parametric 
models above. Other values of  
θ gave smaller values for the R2 
than the semilog model.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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FIGURE 5 WELFARE COST OF INFLATION UNDER PROPORTIONAL BARGAINING
It is equal to the change in steady-state welfare multiplied by θ. In ﬁ  gure 6, real balances are divided 
by aggregate output, and the welfare metric of the model is a compensated measure, which explains 
the slight discrepancy between the two lines.
As one varies the buyer’s share from 0.3 to 1, the cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation varies from slightly 
more than 1 percent to 6 percent of GDP. In order to understand why the welfare triangle can under-
estimate the true welfare cost of inﬂ  ation, consider the following example. Suppose that each unit of 
good produced in a bilateral match is worth $1 for the buyer and costs $0.9 to produce. The marginal 
surplus of a trade is then $0.1. Suppose that the price is $0.95, so that both the buyer and the seller get 
a surplus of $0.05. The private return of money is equal to the buyer’s surplus divided by the amount 
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money is the total surplus divided by the price of the good, 0.1/0.95 = 10.5 percent. If the interest rate 
is 10 percent, the cost of holding $0.95 for the buyer is larger than the marginal gain of $0.05. So the 
buyer has no incentive to bring an additional dollar even though the return of this dollar to society is 
larger than the opportunity cost incurred by the buyer. 
This discrepancy between the private and social beneﬁ  ts of real balances arises from a rent-shar-
ing externality. The marginal beneﬁ  t of the real balances from the buyer’s point of view is smaller 
than the marginal beneﬁ  t from society’s point of view. Since the money demand estimated from the 
data only captures the marginal beneﬁ  t of money from the buyer’s side, the welfare triangle misses a 
fraction of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. This externality arises from any pricing rule that stipulates that 
the buyer does not get the full marginal return of his real balances.17 
This point is illustrated in ﬁ  gure 7. For a given stock of real balances m0, the marginal beneﬁ  t that 
money provides to the money holder, the length of segment AB, is smaller than the marginal societal 
beneﬁ  t of money, the length of segment AD. If prices are determined according to a proportional so-
lution, the ratio BA/DA is the buyer’s share. As a consequence, when measuring the area underneath 
the demand for real balances, the ABC area, one underestimates the social beneﬁ  t of money, the ADC 
area, by a factor equal to the inverse of the buyer’s share.
In ﬁ  gure 7, the two curves representing the private and social beneﬁ  ts of real balances intersect 
the horizontal axis (r = 0) for the same value m* of real balances. At this point, the total beneﬁ  ts of real 
balances are maximized for both buyers and society. This observation implies that the Friedman rule 
yields the best allocation of resources for society for all values of the buyer’s share, θ . 
The result in which the Friedman rule generates the ﬁ  rst-best allocation does not hold for all 
bargaining solutions. For instance, it does not hold for the Nash (1950) solution, according to which 












FIGURE 7 THE RENT-SHARING EXTERNALITY
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17. This rent-sharing externality is 
closely related to holdup problems 
noted in the investment literature.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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where θ is now the bargaining power of the buyer.18 The buyer’s share, Θ , depends on both θ and q, 
and it is equal to θ when q = q*. In particular, the buyer’s share, Θ , decreases as q increases. As shown 
by Lagos and Wright (2005), if prices in bilateral matches are determined according to the Nash solu-
tion, then the Friedman rule is optimal but the quantities traded in the decentralized market are too 
low. This result is illustrated in ﬁ  gure 8. At the Friedman rule (r = 0) the economy’s real balances are 
 m, while the real balances that would maximize society’s welfare are m*. In other words, if the inter-
est rate is zero, an individual’s demand for real balances is satiated even though the marginal beneﬁ  t of 
money to society is still positive. This inefﬁ  ciency is called a “nonmonotonicity inefﬁ  ciency” to reﬂ  ect 
the fact that the buyer’s surplus from a trade does not necessarily increase with the match surplus.19  
Put differently, the buyer’s surplus uq zq () () −  reaches a maximum for a value of q smaller than q*. 
This inefﬁ  ciency has two important consequences for the welfare effects of inﬂ  ation. First, a small in-
crease of the interest rate above r = 0 will have a larger effect on welfare than in the case under pro-
portional bargaining solutions. Indeed, the welfare cost of a small interest rate can be approximated 
by the change in real balances multiplied by the social beneﬁ  t of real balances at r = 0. This second 
term, measured by the length of the segment EC in ﬁ  gure 8, is now positive at r = 0. Second, real bal-
ances are inefﬁ  ciently low at r = 0, and, as a consequence, the quantities produced and consumed in 
bilateral matches are also too low.
Figure 9 plots the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation when prices are determined according to the Nash 
solution for different values of the buyer’s bargaining power, θ. The comparison of ﬁ  gures 5 and 9 
reveals that the welfare cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation under the Nash solution is of same magnitude as 
the cost under the proportional bargaining solution. In both cases, there is a rent-sharing externality 
at work, which ampliﬁ  es the cost of inﬂ  ation. However, under the Nash solution, the buyer’s share, 
Θ, gets larger for higher inﬂ  ation rates so that the rent-sharing externality gets smaller. The most no-
ticeable difference between ﬁ  gures 5 and 9 is the gain associated with a reduction of the interest rate 
from 3 percent to zero (which corresponds to the optimal deﬂ  ation rate). This gain can be as high as 
2.5 percent of GDP when the buyer’s bargaining power is 0.3. Under the proportional solution, this 
19. In order to illustrate this 
inefﬁ  ciency, consider a bargaining 
problem where two individuals 
must share a prize. If one of the 
two individuals gets worse off as 
the size of the prize increases, 
then the bargaining solution is 
said to be nonmonotonic. For a 
detailed treatment of alterna-
tive bargaining solutions and 
their properties in monetary 
economies, see Rocheteau and 
Waller (2004).
FIGURE 8 BARGAINING INEFFICIENCIES
18. The bargaining power θ, which 
varies from 0 to 1, is a measure 
of the buyer’s strength in the 
bargaining process. In an explicit 
bargaining game with offers and 
counteroffers, the bargaining 
power of an individual depends, 
among other things, on his 
ability to threaten to terminate the 
negotiation if his offer is rejected.
m ~












Social marginal benefit of money
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gain is about 0.5 percent of GDP. So the nonmonotonicity inefﬁ  ciency is important in that it predicts 
large welfare gains if inﬂ  ation is reduced from zero to the optimal deﬂ  ation rate.
To conclude this section, we present a pricing mechanism which exhibits the same type of inef-
ﬁ  ciencies as the Nash bargaining solution but which is based on the possibly more familiar idea that 
prices are set as a markup over the cost incurred by sellers.20 More precisely, the transfer of money 
from the buyer to the seller corresponds to the cost incurred by the seller in producing the amount 
asked for by the buyer multiplied by a constant factor, 1+ μ, (where  μ ≥ 0), which we interpret as the 
“markup,”  zq cq () ( )() =+ 1 μ . As shown in ﬁ  gure 10, the cost of inﬂ  ation increases with the markup. 
When the markup is 20 percent, the cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation is slightly more than 3 percent of 
GDP, which is similar to the prediction of the model under the symmetric Nash solution.
FIGURE 9 COST OF INFLATION UNDER NASH BARGAINING
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20. For a search model with price 
posting by sellers, see Ennis 
(2004). Ennis (2004) describes 
an economy in which buyers 
have private information about 
their tastes, and sellers make 
take-it-or-leave-it offers. The an-
nual welfare cost of a 10 percent 
inﬂ  ation in this model is between 
4 percent and 7 percent of GDP.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
11
Figure 11 illustrates how a constant markup affects the assessment of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. 
The constant markup,  μ , shifts the curve indicating the social return of real balances up by a constant 
amount (BD = CE), which reﬂ  ects the seller’s marginal beneﬁ  t from buyers’ real balances. The larger 
the markup, the larger the difference between private and social beneﬁ  ts of real balances. Also, it is 
clear from ﬁ  gures 8 and 11 that both the Nash solution and the pricing with constant markup induce 
qualitatively similar effects of inﬂ  ation. In both cases, the quantities traded at the Friedman rule (r = 0) 
are too low.
Participation Decisions 
In the basic model described in the previous sections, the frequency of trade is assumed to be con-
stant. So inﬂ  ation affects the quantities traded in bilateral meetings, but it does not affect the number 
of those meetings. In order to endogenize the number of trade matches, one can let buyers and sell-
ers choose whether or not to participate in the market, or let them choose on which side of the mar-
ket to participate in, or even let them choose the resources they will invest in the search for a trading 
partner.21 By taking into account these participation decisions, one can introduce general equilibrium 
effects of inﬂ  ation, which are not captured by the Bailey methodology. Also, in environments with 
search frictions, participation decisions tend to be inefﬁ  cient. Consequently, the welfare effects of in-
ﬂ  ation are ambiguous and depend on the way in which inﬂ  ation distorts participation decisions. 
We consider in the following an extension of the Lagos-Wright model, which is based on an 
assumption in Shi (1997).22  The economy is similar to the one previously described except that at the 
beginning of each period, before matches are formed, individuals can choose to be buyers or sellers in 
the decentralized market. For instance, agents in the labor market can choose to be buyers (entrepre-
neurs) or sellers (workers). An agent who chooses to be a buyer cannot produce during the day, while 
an agent who chooses to be a seller cannot consume during the day. The composition of buyers and 
sellers is then endogenous. Let n denote the fraction of sellers in the economy. Assume further that 
the matching process is such that a buyer meets a seller with probability n, whereas a seller meets a 
FIGURE 11 CONSTANT MARKUP
21. Rocheteau and Wright (2005) 
consider a model with free entry 
of sellers. Shi (1997) describes 
an economy in which individuals 
can choose which side of the 
market to participate in. See also 
Rocheteau and Wright (2004) 
and Faig (2004). Li (1995, 1997) 
introduces endogenous search 
intensities.
22. Our model is similar to the one 
in Rocheteau and Wright (2004), 
except that we consider different 
pricing mechanisms.
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buyer with probability 1 – n.23  The fraction of sellers in equilibrium is such that agents are indifferent 
to being buyers or sellers,
−+ − [] =− () − [] rz q n u q z q n z q c q () () () () () . 1
The left-hand side of the previous equation is the expected utility of a buyer, the right-hand 
side is the expected utility of a seller, and q is the equilibrium quantity traded in bilateral match-
es.24 We assume that prices are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution, 
zq cq uq () () ( )() =+ − θθ 1 . 
The equilibrium allocation is socially efﬁ  cient if θ = 0.5 and r = 0. The second requirement cor-
responds to the Friedman rule, and it guarantees that q = q*. The ﬁ  rst requirement,  θ = 0.5, is the 
condition under which the number of trades is maximized; this maximization requires n = 1/2. It cor-
responds to the Hosios (1990) condition according to which the number of trades is efﬁ  cient only in 
the unlikely event that an agent’s share of the match surplus is equal to his marginal contribution to 
the creation of trade matches.25  The best outcome for a search monetary economy requires that both 
the Hosios condition and the Friedman rule hold.26  
The deﬁ  nition of the aggregate demand for money is the money held by the 1 – n buyers divided 











We use the same strategy as before to estimate the parameters A and η  of money demand. In 
ﬁ  gure 12, we report the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. When the buyer’s share is less than 50 percent, the 
number of buyers is too low and inﬂ  ation lowers the fraction of buyers even further. The welfare cost 
of low inﬂ  ation is then larger than what would be obtained under the assumption in which the fre-
quency of trades is constant. Reciprocally, the welfare gains from reducing the interest rate to zero are 
also large. When the buyer’s share is above 50 percent, a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal. 
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23. The speciﬁ  cation for the matching 
function is the same as the one 
used in most monetary models, 
including Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1993). Obviously, it would be 
desirable to estimate the transac-
tion technology. This strategy has 
been pursued successfully in the 
labor literature. We leave this 
extension for future investigation.
24. The money supply is growing 
through lump-sum transfers. Such 
transfers do not affect agents’ 
decisions to be buyers or sellers.
25. The elasticity of the number of 
trades with respect to the number 
of buyers in the economy is n. 
Therefore, the Hosios condition 
requires θ = n. When r = 0, 
n =− 1 θ,  so that the optimal 
allocation requires θ = 05 ..  
26. For an elaboration of this idea, 
see Berentsen, Rocheteau, and 
Shi (2004).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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In this case, if r = 0, then the number of buyers is too high and the number of trades is too low. Since 
inﬂ  ation has a direct negative effect on buyers’ expected utility, the number of buyers falls, while the 
number of sellers increases.27 The composition in the market becomes more even and the number of 
trades increases.28 When the buyer’s share is 90 percent, then the cost of implementing the Friedman 
rule is about 0.5 percent of GDP while the cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation is close to 0.
The results reported in ﬁ  gure 12 have been derived by assuming that terms of trade are set accord-
ing to a proportional bargaining solution. As in the previous section, different bargaining solutions can 
have very different properties in terms of the efﬁ  ciency of the equilibrium allocation at the Friedman 
rule. For example, in the basic Lagos-Wright model, the equilibrium allocation is efﬁ  cient at the Fried-
man rule under the proportional bargaining solution, but it is inefﬁ  cient under the Nash solution. Not 
too surprisingly, the choice of the pricing mechanism will also matter considerably for the welfare 
cost of inﬂ  ation when participation decisions are endogenous. 
Figure 13 reports the cost of inﬂ  ation when the terms of trade are determined according to the 
Nash solution. In sharp contrast to the results obtained under the proportional solution, there is no 
positive effect of inﬂ  ation on welfare. The optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule. The “non-
monotonicity inefﬁ  ciency” of the Nash solution changes the nature of the trade-off between the 
negative effect of inﬂ  ation on individual real balances and the effect of inﬂ  ation on the composition 
of the market. Indeed, since real balances are inefﬁ  ciently low at the Friedman rule under the Nash 
solution, a small increase of the interest rate reduces real balances, which has a ﬁ  rst-order negative 
effect on welfare. For the calibrated version of the model, this negative real balance effect dominates 
any positive effect of inﬂ  ation on the composition of the market.29 As a consequence, a deviation 
from the Friedman rule is not optimal under the Nash solution. The comparison of ﬁ  gures 9 and 13 
reveals that the presence of search externalities exacerbates the cost of inﬂ  ation for large values of 
the buyer’s bargaining power. If the buyer’s bargaining power is 0.5, results are largely similar to those 
obtained in the absence of search externalities, because at this value of θ , the composition of the 
market is similar to the market in which σ =12 . If the buyer’s bargaining power is 0.9, the cost of 
10 percent inﬂ  ation is about 4.5 percent of GDP in the presence of search frictions, whereas it is less 
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27. This effect is sensitive to the 
choice of the pricing mechanism. 
For instance, under the Nash 
solution the number of buyers can 
increase with inﬂ  ation because 
the buyer’s share in the surplus of 
a match gets bigger.
28. The result in which the Friedman 
rule is not always optimal in the 
presence of search externalities 
could raise the following objec-
tion. If the government was able 
to make transfers contingent on 
agents’ participation decisions, 
then it could take care of the 
search externalities by an ap-
propriate transfer scheme, while 
the Friedman rule would be used 
to reduce the monetary wedge 
associated with the inﬂ  ation tax. 
In practice, however, it may be 
difﬁ  cult to implement transfers 
contingent on agents’ participation 
decisions since these decisions 
may not be observable. Inﬂ  ation, 
which is a tax on market activities, 
may be an effective instrument for 
correcting inefﬁ  cient participation 
in the market.
29. For other parameterizations, a 
deviation from the Friedman rule 
could raise society’s welfare. 
However, the result according 
to which a deviation from the 
Friedman rule is less likely under 
Nash bargaining than under 
proportional bargaining is robust. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, JANUARY 2006
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than 2 percent of GDP when the frequency of trades is exogenous. Also, the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation 
is not a monotonic function of the buyer’s bargaining power. An increase in the buyer’s bargaining 
power makes the rent-sharing externality less severe, but it also distorts the composition of the mar-
ket toward too many buyers. 
To summarize, the introduction of endogenous participation decisions has several implications. 
First, the welfare triangle is a misleading measure since it does not capture the distortionary effects 
of inﬂ  ation on individuals’ participation decisions. Second, the presence of search externalities can 
mitigate or exacerbate the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. Third, the Friedman rule may no longer be optimal, 
as the positive effect of inﬂ  ation on the composition of the market and the frequency of trades can 
dominate the negative effect of inﬂ  ation on real balances.
Distributional Effects 
The Lagos-Wright model described in the previous sections has been designed in such a way that all 
agents, despite different trading histories in the decentralized market, start each period with the same 
money balances. This property of the model is what makes it tractable. However, because the distribu-
tion of money balances is degenerate, inﬂ  ation does not have any distributional effect. Levine (1991), 
Molico (1999), and Deviatov and Wallace (2001), among others, have provided examples in which 
a policy that consists of increasing the money supply through lump-sum transfers induces some re-
distribution across individuals. For individuals with large stocks of nominal assets, the burden associ-
ated with the inﬂ  ation tax is greater than the beneﬁ  t of receiving a lump-sum transfer. On the other 
hand, individuals with few nominal assets enjoy a net beneﬁ  t from the lump-sum transfer. In some cir-
cumstances this redistribution can be beneﬁ  cial to society. For example, if agents are subject to idio-
syncratic shocks (on endowments, productivity, and so forth) that cannot be insured against, money 
growth can provide an insurance mechanism.30 
We capture the distributional effects of inﬂ  ation through a simple extension of the Lagos- Wright 
model. Recall that in the Lagos-Wright model individuals live forever, and, in each period of their lives, 
they trade sequentially in a centralized market and a decentralized market. We depart from these as-
sumptions by assuming that individuals live only two periods. They are born at the beginning of the 
centralized market, and they die at the end of the following period after the centralized market has 
closed. Also, agents do not discount utility across periods. When agents are born, they have access to 
the centralized market in order to make their choice of money balances. In the second period of their 
lives, they trade in the decentralized market and then have access to the centralized market before 
they die. Only a fraction p of the newly-born agents are able to produce in the ﬁ  rst period of their 
lives. One can interpret this assumption as individuals receiving productivity shocks. In the absence 
of money growth, agents who cannot produce cannot accumulate money and, therefore, cannot con-
sume in the decentralized market in the second period of their lives. By inﬂ  ating the money supply 
the government can transfer money to all individuals, irrespective of their productivities, and there-
fore smooth consumption across all agents. 
The demand for real balances from productive agents is the same as the one described in the previ-
ous sections. The main difference with respect to the previous models is the fact that the distribution 
of real balances has two points, z, the real balances of productive agents, and   z, the real balances of 
unproductive agents. The aggregate demand for money balances is then  
30. In Molico’s (1999) version of the 
search-theoretic model, individu-
als trade only in a decentralized 
market with bilateral random 
matching. Since the matching 
process is random, trading 
opportunities arrive according 
to a stochastic process. Some 
individuals are lucky and can sell 
their output often: They then have 
a large stock of money balances. 
Other individuals are less lucky 
and have a low stock of real 
balances. Molico shows that for 
low inﬂ  ation rates the redistribu-
tive effect of inﬂ  ation, according to 
which inﬂ  ation acts as a subsidy 
for the poor and a tax on the rich, 
can dominate the real balance 
effect of inﬂ  ation, according to 
which inﬂ  ation reduces aggregate 
real balances. In Craig and 
Waller’s (2004) version of a 
decentralized market with two 
currencies, one of which inﬂ  ates, 
low rates of inﬂ  ation can induce a 
strong redistributive effect in the 
inﬂ  ating currency where buyers 
are likely to hold either large 
amounts of the currency or none 
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The strategy to estimate the model is the same as before. Society’s welfare is measured by the sum 
of the trade surpluses in all matches. The welfare cost corresponding to an interest rate, r, is the frac-
tion by which total consumption at the steady state with a 3 percent interest rate must be reduced in 
order to achieve the same welfare as the one that prevails at the steady state with r.31 In ﬁ  gure 14, we 
plot the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation when prices are determined according to the proportional bargain-
ing solution with θ = 1/2. As in Molico (1999), society’s welfare is maximized for a positive inﬂ  ation 
rate. The welfare gains associated with a positive interest rate are rather small. When calibrating the 
FIGURE 14 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF INFLATION
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31. Note that we kept the benchmark 
for the interest rate at 3 percent. 
Since agents do not discount 
future utility, this interest rate cor-
responds to a 3 percent inﬂ  ation.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, JANUARY 2006
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model, the coefﬁ  cient that describes the aversion of individuals toward risk is low (the coefﬁ  cient of 
relative risk aversion is close to 0.2), and it is, in fact, lower than what is usually thought realistic.
If one increases this coefﬁ  cient to make it a little bit more realistic, the welfare gain corresponding 
to the redistribution effect of inﬂ  ation gets larger. For example, in ﬁ  gure 15 we plot the cost of inﬂ  a-
tion for the same value of the parameter A as the one used to draw ﬁ  gure 14 but for a coefﬁ  cient of 
relative risk aversion raised to 0.5. The beneﬁ  ts of inﬂ  ation get signiﬁ  cantly bigger and increase with 
the probability that an agent receives a negative productivity shock.
Conclusion 
We have presented some insights provided by the search theory of monetary exchange for the under-
standing of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. Using different extensions of the model of Lagos and Wright 
(2005), we have identiﬁ  ed and quantiﬁ  ed various effects of inﬂ  ation on welfare. First, inﬂ  ation has a 
negative real balance effect. The inﬂ  ation tax introduces a wedge in the decision to invest in real bal-
ances. The extent of this distortion depends crucially on the assumed pricing mechanism. If buyers 
receive the full marginal beneﬁ  t of their money balances, the cost of inﬂ  ation is essentially the Bailey 
measure, given by the area underneath the money demand function. In all other cases, the Bailey mea-
sure has to be scaled up by a function that depends on the sellers’ share in the surplus of a trade. We 
have also provided examples of pricing mechanisms under which the Friedman rule fails to generate 
the ﬁ  rst-best allocation. In such cases, the beneﬁ  t of implementing the optimal deﬂ  ation is large. Sec-
ond, inﬂ  ation affects agents’ decisions to participate in the market and therefore it affects the number 
of trades. However, since participation decisions tend to be inefﬁ  cient in search environments, the 
effect of inﬂ  ation on participation choices can be welfare-enhancing or welfare-worsening. We have 
provided calibrated examples in which a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal. We have shown 
once again that the welfare effects of inﬂ  ation depend crucially on the pricing mechanism. Third, in-
ﬂ  ation can generate a redistribution across agents. If agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, this 
redistribution can prove useful to society. 
Additional extensions would be worth considering. As emphasized by Cooley and Hansen (1989, 
1991) and Dotsey and Ireland (1996), the inﬂ  ation tax can distort a variety of marginal decisions: 
among others, the leisure-consumption choice and the accumulation of capital. Aruoba and Wright 
(2003) and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2004) have extended the Lagos-Wright model to allow for 
capital accumulation and have considered various assumptions regarding how capital enters the 
economy. Also, as Kocherlakota (2004) pointed out, it is important to extend search models in order 
to incorporate additional assets beside money, such as government bonds, and to take into account 
distortionary taxes. Finally, one can introduce realistic nominal rigidities in the search model of money 
along the lines suggested by Craig and Rocheteau (2004).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Appendix 1: The Model
The Lagos-Wright Model of Monetary Exchange 
We present brieﬂ  y the search-theoretic model of monetary exchange proposed by Lagos and Wright 
(2005). Time is discrete and each period of time is divided into two subperiods: the day and night. 
During the day trades take place in a decentralized market where agents are matched bilaterally. 
There is a lack of double coincidence of wants in bilateral matches. The probability for an agent to 
ﬁ  nd someone who produces a good he likes is σ , and the probability to ﬁ  nd someone who likes the 
good he produces is σ. With probability 12 − σ  an agent is unmatched. Night trades take place in a 
competitive market. Money is introduced in the economy through lump-sum transfers in the central-
ized market and the supply of money is growing at the rate π. We only focus on steady-state equilib-
ria where real balances are constant. 
An agent’s utility function is
uq cq x
bs () () , −+
where qb is the consumption and qs the production in a bilateral match and x is the net consump-
tion in the centralized market (x is negative if an agent produces more at night than he consumes). 
When we calibrate the money demand function we assume uq q () / ( ) =−
− 1 1
η η , where η ∈(,) 01  
and cq q () = . The discount factor is  βρ =+ ∈
− () ( , ) 10 1
1 . 
Let pt denote the price in the centralized market. The utility of an agent holding mt units of money 








































s.t. p px m m T tt t t t += + + ˆ 1
where V() ⋅  is the expected utility of the individual in the decentralized market. 
The individual receives a lump-sum transfer Tt and chooses his net consumption xt and his money 
balances  ˆ mt+1 in the next period. It is straightforward to check that the value function is linear and 
that the choice of  ˆ mt+1 is independent of mt. Note that the absolute value of consumption and produc-
tion in the centralized market is not determined within the model. The aggregate production in the 
centralized market will be determined by calibration. 
Terms of trade (q,d) in a bilateral match, where q is the output and d the real transfer of money, are 
determined by a bargaining solution. In general, the terms of trade maximize a monotonic function of 
the surpluses of the buyer and the seller in the match. Those surpluses are independent of the money 
balances of the buyer and the seller. Also, for standard bargaining solutions, (q,d) only depends on the 
real balances  zm p tt t = /  of the buyer. 
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where (qb,db) are the terms of trade when the agent is the buyer and (qs,ds) are the terms of trade 
when the agent is the seller. In equilibrium,  qd qd
bb ss ,, () = ()  since all agents hold the same money 
balances. Substitute V(mt / pt) into the Bellman equation for Wm p tt (/)  and rearrange in order to 




rz q uq z q max () () (), −+ − [] {} σ
where the nominal interest rate rt satisﬁ  es 11 1 +=+ + rt () () πρ  and where z(q) relates the buyer’s 
real balances to the quantity of goods he can purchase from the seller. So the agent essentially maxi-
mizes the expected surplus he gets when he is a buyer minus the cost of holding real balances. 
Pricing Mechanisms 
The form of the function z(q) depends on the bargaining solution. If buyers have all the bargaining 

























If terms of trade are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution, then 
the relationship between individual balances and the quantity traded in a match is given by 
zq cq uq () () ( )() =+ − θθ 1 , where θ  is the buyer’s share in the match surplus. Using the linear 
speciﬁ  cation for c(q) and the CRRA speciﬁ  cation for u(q), and the ﬁ  rst-order condition for the choice 




















































If terms of trade are determined according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution where the 

























Finally, if prices are set as a constant markup over the cost incurred by sellers, the function z(q) 
satisﬁ  es
zq cq () ( )() . =+ 1 μFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Calibration 
The money demand function that is confronted with the data is deﬁ  ned as aggregate money balances 
divided by aggregate nominal output. It is equal to
M
Mp A σ +
,
where M is aggregate money balances, σ  is the frequency of trades in the decentralized market, p 
is the price in the centralized market, and A is the real output in the centralized market. Since z =






















The frequency of trades is set to σ  = 0.5 so that each individual is matched and is either a buyer or 
a seller. The parameters A and η  are chosen to ﬁ  t money demand in the United States over the period 
1900–2000. The same procedure is used for other pricing mechanisms. 
Social and Private Marginal Returns of Real Balances 
A marginal unit of real balances allows a buyer to buy ∂∂ qz /  units of goods in the event a 
match occurs. The expected private marginal return of real balances, or equivalently, the ex-
pected increase of the buyer’s utility from holding an additional unit of real balances, is then 
σσ ′ − ′ [] ∂∂ = ′′ − [] uq zq q z uq zq () () / () / ()1 , which is precisely r from the ﬁ  rst-order  con-
dition for the choice of real balances. The expected social marginal return of real balances is 
σσ ′ − ′ [] ∂∂ = ′ − ′ [] ′ uq cq q z uq cq zq () () / () ()/ () . Note that the private and social returns of real bal-
ances are equal when buyers have all the bargaining power since z(q) = c(q). If prices are determined 





























So the social return of real balances is equal to the interest rate divided by the buyer’s bargaining pow-
er. Finally, if prices are determined according to a constant markup  μ  over the cost incurred by the 
































So the social return of real balances is equal to the interest rate plus a constant term that is increas-
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Accurateness of the Welfare Triangle Measure 
The inverse money demand function of the search model is given by
ru q x q x = ′[] ′ − {} σ () () , 1
where q(x) is the function that speciﬁ  es the output traded in bilateral matches as a function of real 
balances. Denote z0(zr) the real balances at the steady-state equilibrium with an interest rate of 3 per-
cent (r percent). Integrate the inverse money demand function from zr to z0 in order to obtain the 
welfare triangle measure (denoted WT),
WT u q x q x dx





= ′[] ′ − {}








When buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers,
W T uqz cqz uqz cqz rr = [] − [] {} − [] − [] {} σσ () () () () . 00
In this case, he welfare triangle coincides exactly with the change in society’s welfare. When prices 
are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution, 
W T uqz cqz uqz cqz rr = [] − [] {} − [] − [] {} σθ σθ () () () () . 00
Now the welfare triangle measure is equal to the buyer’s share times the change in society’s welfare. 
Measuring the Welfare Cost of Inﬂ  ation 
Consider two steady states, one associated with an interest rate of 3 percent (the nominal interest rate 
that is consistent with 0 inﬂ  ation) and one associated with an interest r. The welfare cost of an interest 
rate r is measured by the rate Δ , at which consumption in the steady state with an interest rate of 3 
percent must be decreased to make agents indifferent between this steady state and the steady state 
with a nominal interest rate r. Let qr denote the quantities traded in a steady state when the interest 
rate is r. The cost of inﬂ  ation Δ solves
σσ uq cq A uq cq rr 00 3 00 3 1 .. ( ) ( ) () () . − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ − {} −= − [] ΔΔ






























Endogenous Composition of Buyers and Sellers 
We introduce an assumption used by Shi (1997), and subsequently by Rocheteau and Wright (2004), 
Rocheteau and Waller (2005) and Faig (2004), to endogenize the frequency of trades. In the Lagos-
Wright model, each individual can be a buyer or a seller in the decentralized market depending on 
whom he meets. The frequency of trades is then given by an exogenous matching probability σ . We FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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now allow each agent to choose on which side of the market to participate in: Each agent can choose 
to be a buyer or a seller in the decentralized market. Let n denote the fraction of sellers. The matching 
technology is such that a buyer meets a seller with probability n and a seller meets a buyer with prob-
ability 1 – n. So the aggregate number of trades is n(1 – n) and it is maximum when the composition 
of the market is symmetric, n = 1 – n = 1/2. The number of sellers in equilibrium is such that an agent 
is indifferent between being a buyer or a seller. Consequently, n satisﬁ  es
−+ − [] =− − [] rz q n u q z q n z q c q () () () ( ) () () , 1
where z(q) is the buyer’s real balances as a function of q. (The growth of money supply occurs 
through lump-sum transfers. These transfers do not affect agents’ decisions to be buyers or sellers.) 
The right hand-side is the expected surplus of a buyer in the decentralized market net of the cost of 
holding real balances. The right hand-side is the expected utility of a seller in the decentralized mar-











The form taken by z(q) depends on the pricing mechanism that is assumed. If prices are determined 
by the proportional bargaining solution then 
zq cq uq () () ( )() . =+ − θθ 1






































where both n and z are functions of the interest rate r. Since the number of trades is n(1 – n), steady-
state welfare is measured by n(1 – n)[u(q) – c(q)]. The welfare cost of inﬂ  ation is the value Δ  that 
solves
nn u q c qA n n u q rr r 00 3 00 3 00 3 00 3 11 1 .. . . () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) −− ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ − {} −= − − ΔΔ c cq r () , []
where nr and qr are the values for n and q at the steady state corresponding to the interest rate r. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, JANUARY 2006
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Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy 
We now consider a variant of the Lagos-Wright model where individuals only live for three periods. All 
agents are born at the beginning of night before the centralized market opens, and they die at the end 
of the subsequent period after the centralized market closes. So agents can trade in the ﬁ  rst period 
of their life in the centralized market and in the second period of their life in both the decentralized 
market and the centralized market. For simplicity, we assume that agents do not discount future utility, 
ρ = 0, so that r = π . In the second period of their lives, agents are identical to the agents in the Lagos-
Wright model. In order to introduce distributional effects of monetary policy we add the following 
assumption. Only a fraction p of the newly-born agents are able to produce in the ﬁ  rst period of their 
lives. The remaining 1 – p cannot produce and therefore cannot obtain money balances except from 
lump-sum transfers by the government. If p = 1 the model is analogous to the Lagos-Wright model. 
The choice q (the quantity consumed in the decentralized market) by newly-born agents satisﬁ  es
q
rz q u q z q max () () (), −+ − [] {} σ
where z(q) is given by the bargaining solution. Let Tt denote the lump-sum transfer at night in period 
t. By deﬁ  nition TM M M tt t t =− = +1 π , where Mt is the quantity of money in the decentralized market 
in period t. Let mt denote the nominal money balances held by agents who can produce. Agents who 










Let qq tt ()   denote the quantity consumed in the decentralized market by those agents who can (can-








If π  = 0, then   q = 0 ; and if π =∞, then qq =  . The aggregate money demand function that has to 
be ﬁ  tted to the data is
pz q p z q


























Social welfare is measured simply by the sum of utilities across agents, that is,
σσ puq cq p uq cq () () ( ) () () . − [] +− − [] 1 
The welfare cost of inﬂ  ation is measured by Δ  that solves
σσ puq cq p uq cq 00 3 00 3 00 3 0 11 1 .. .. ()( )() ()( − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ − {} +− − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ − ΔΔ  0 03
1
)
() () ( )() () .
{} −
=− [] +− − []
A
puq cq p uq cq rr rr
Δ
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Appendix 2: Data Description 
The interest rate is the short-term commercial paper rate. From 1900 to 1975, it is taken from Fried-
man and Schwartz (1982), Table 4.8, Column 6. From 1976 to 1994, it is from the Economic Report 
of the President (1996), Table B-69. From 1995 to 1997, it is from Economic Report of the President 
(2003), Table B-73. From 1998 to 2000 it is the short-term 90-day AA credit rate from the Federal Re-
serve Board, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/m/fp3m.txt. Money supply is M1, as of De-
cember of each year, and is not seasonally adjusted. From 1900 to 1914, it is from the Historical Sta-
tistics of the United States (1960), Series X-267. From 1915 to 1960, it is from Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963), pp. 708–744, col. 7. From 1961 to 2000, it is from the FRED II database of the St. Louis Fed. 
Nominal GDP from 1900 to 1928 is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colo-
nial Times to Present (1970, F-1 p. 224). From 1929 to 2000, it is from the GDPA series from the Citi-
base database.
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DATA SET (CONTINUED)
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  A η R2
Log–Log: mr A
r () =
−η 0.097835 0.29953 0.6238
Semilog: mr A
r () =
−η 0.43056 11.027 0.6750
Nonparametric 0.6795
Appendix 2: Parameter Values 
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(iv) Endogenous participation and
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